Development action with informed and engaged societies
After nearly 28 years, The Communication Initiative (The CI) Global is entering a new chapter. Following a period of transition, the global website has been transferred to the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in South Africa, where it will be administered by the Social and Behaviour Change Communication Division. Wits' commitment to social change and justice makes it a trusted steward for The CI's legacy and future.
 
Co-founder Victoria Martin is pleased to see this work continue under Wits' leadership. Victoria knows that co-founder Warren Feek (1953–2024) would have felt deep pride in The CI Global's Africa-led direction.
 
We honour the team and partners who sustained The CI for decades. Meanwhile, La Iniciativa de Comunicación (CILA) continues independently at lainiciativadecomunicacion.com and is linked with The CI Global site.
Time to read
2 minutes
Read so far

Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations: Briefing Paper B: Do No Harm

0 comments
Date
Summary

This 13-page briefing paper from the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) considers a number of ways in which donors might inadvertently "do harm" in situations of conflict and fragility. For instance, DFID's activities risked fuelling conflict in a number of ways - namely:

  • Aid focused on capacity-building and awareness raising benefited elite groups and provided little benefit to the most excluded groups.
  • Aid which demanded community contributions put an unfair burden on women and the economically poorest, and they resented it.
  • Aid was focused on more accessible areas, limiting benefits to the economically poorest and most conflict-affected regions of the mid- and far-west.

 

As illustrated by the above (and other examples provided in this briefing paper), some harm may be unavoidable, and DFID offices face constraints in their attempts to avoid harm. That said, the concept of "do no harm" carries within it the potential to drive positive responses. To that end, the report examines some of the "do no harm" dilemmas facing donors, and looks at programming approaches that have been used to avoid harm and contribute to peace and stability.

 

The first section explores how donors may inadvertently do harm - that is, by increasing conflict (e.g., by undermining structures and relationships in society that enable people to live together peacefully (connectors), or, conversely, by enhancing the factors that push people apart (dividers); by failing to pursue conflict-sensitive development (audits should help bridge the gap that can emerge between analysis and programming); and/or undermining statebuilding processes (for example, by substituting instead of developing capacity).

 

A series of competing objectives are next outlined; they include: (i) immediate service delivery versus capacity development; (ii) immediate security versus long-term stability; and (iii) poverty reduction versus addressing inequality.

 

The subsequent section explores DFID's Conditionality Policy, which aims to bring about a more balanced partnership between DFID and recipient governments in an effort to end the practice of forcing countries to accept certain policy prescriptions and to make aid more predictable. The policy sets 3 criteria as the basis for partnership: (i) a commitment to poverty reduction; (ii) respect for human rights and other international obligations; and (iii) improved public financial management and accountability. Breaches of these criteria do not trigger automatic suspension of aid, but instead lead to dialogue.

 

Amongst the key lessons outlined here is this one: While recognising the trade-offs between long-term and short-term objectives (e.g. capacity development and service delivery), it is important to develop long-term frameworks at an early stage, alongside addressing immediate needs. One example provided earlier in the report illustrates this point. The violence that followed the withdrawal of Indonesian rule from East Timor in 1999 led to the departure of most health professionals and extensive destruction of health facilities. Donors initially relied on international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) to provide emergency health services, but they also supported the development of new health institutions. A transition strategy was developed, beginning with high-priority areas such as immunisation, tuberculosis, and health promotion. Within a 4-year period, East Timor was estimated to have six functioning hospitals, 65 community health centres, and 170 health posts, giving 87% of the population access to a health facility within 2 hours' walk. The key success factors were: (i) keeping the long-term vision in mind while delivering immediate short-term benefits; (ii) the early development of coordination mechanisms and a strategic framework; (iii) a phased transition process, which did not demand too much from national systems too early; and (iv) the provision by donors of flexible, coordinated support, enabling INGO service delivery.

Source

Email from Emma Grant to The Communication Initiative on March 9 2010.